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what litigation of a Climate nuisanCe suit 
might look like
by Michael B . Gerrard*
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP),
1 the 
Supreme Court explicitly left ajar the door to litigation under 
state (as opposed to federal) common law for greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. Some plaintiffs’ lawyers are also arguing 
that the decision leaves room for seeking money damages (rather 
than injunctive relief) even in a federal common law case.
For purposes of this Article, let’s imagine a world in which 
the courthouse doors are swung open to common law claims for 
damages for GHG emissions, and the courts have rejected all 
defenses based on displacement, preemption, political question, 
and standing. In other words, the plaintiffs finally are able to 
litigate the merits. What would that litigation look like?
Because I have spent thirty years as a practicing environ-
mental litigator (sometimes acting for plaintiffs, sometimes for 
defendants)2 prior to entering academia, my head swims with the 
challenges such a case would pose. Most of the voluminous com-
mentary on the common law GHG cases looks at the threshold 
issues; let’s now peer across the threshold and see what’s on 
the other side. What we’ll find is an extraordinary number of 
open questions that would face the parties and the courts; in this 
Article I attempt to enumerate them, without undertaking the 
daunting task of answering them.
seLecTIon oF deFendanTs
It is well recognized that these cases pose unique difficulties 
because current atmospheric levels of GHGs result from the 
cumulative emissions of millions or billions of emitters since the 
onset of the industrial revolution. Adverse impacts result from 
this global cumulative load; no specific injury can be attributed 
to any specific polluter. Thus one early question in any suit 
for money damages is whether liability is joint and several or 
whether liability is proportional.
If the joint and several prong prevails, the inevitable result 
is third-party litigation. The defendants who are named in the 
complaint will sue numerous other GHG emitters who were not 
named, and those new defendants will in turn sue still more. 
That is what happened in the litigation under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) of 19803 over liability for cleaning up contaminated 
sites. The courts ruled that in some circumstances CERCLA 
imposes joint and several liability,4 and it was common in 
large sites—especially landfills that had accepted waste from 
entire regions—to see concentric circles of third-, fourth- and 
fifth-party defendants, ultimately sometimes reaching into the 
hundreds. At least one CERCLA case grew so large that no 
existing courtroom could accommodate the hundreds of lawyers, 
and a special courtroom had to be built in another building.5 
Stories abounded about how large chemical companies were 
impleading donut shops and nursing homes to spread the pain, 
to achieve coercive settlements, and to drag out the cases.6 The 
number of potential defendants in a GHG case is staggering, and 
the consequent case management challenges are immense.
Determining which parties are liable in turn raises several 
questions:
1. peRsonal JuRisdiCtion. 
It’s not clear whether a state court would find it has juris-
diction over GHG sources in distant states. Moreover, only 
approximately 18 percent of today’s carbon dioxide emissions 
come from the United States.7 Of the remainder, some are from 
multinational companies with sufficient contacts in the U.S. to 
be susceptible to service of process here. How will a U.S. court 
assert jurisdiction over the rest, and then enforce judgments 
against them?
2. Reasonableness of ConduCt. 
Public nuisance liability is generally imposed only on those 
who engaged in unreasonable conduct.8 There has been no statutory 
or regulatory limitation on carbon dioxide emissions, at least 
before the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began regu-
lating GHGs in January 2011.9 Thus the emissions that are the 
basis for the assertion of liability were for the most part lawful. 
How will unreasonableness be defined? What is the effect of 
the absence of any commercial technology for controlling GHG 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion (other than using non-
fossil energy, or using less energy)? Since one of the factors 
in determining reasonableness may be the social value of the 
conduct,10 what is the social value of fossil fuel use? Is use of 
fossil fuels intrinsically unreasonable? What is the relevance of 
more than a century of U.S. policy encouraging fossil fuel use 
and the historical dependence of the U.S. economy on fossil fuel 
use? Does it matter whether the fossil fuels were used to sup-
port a very comfortable lifestyle (e.g., United States, Canada, 
Europe, Japan, Australia) or to lift a population out of poverty 
(e.g., China, India)?
3. peRmits. 
As some decisions have suggested,11 is the fact that a facility 
has operated under governmental permits a complete defense to 
a nuisance claim? Does it matter that the permits are silent as to 
GHG emissions?
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4. statute of limitations. 
Many states bar claims for money damages for nuisance 
that were incurred more than a set period before the filing of the 
complaint; in New York, for example, that time is three years.12 
Does that mean that, for a suit brought in 2011, damages could 
only be sought for emissions from 2008 and later?
5. ChoiCe of law. 
Which state’s laws apply to determinations of reasonable-
ness, statutes of limitations, and other issues? If a defendant 
company has emitting facilities in twenty states, do twenty dif-
ferent sets of rules apply to the litigation? What about emissions 
outside of the United States?
6. suCCessoRship. 
Many emissions may be attributable to facilities that closed 
or companies that dissolved decades ago. What principles of 
successor liability might apply? Where no successor exists, who 
pays for the orphan shares?
7. supply Chains. 
Many GHG emissions come from automobile tailpipes. In 
order for that to happen, oil is extracted from wells, transported 
to refineries, refined into gasoline, transported to filling stations, 
and pumped into vehicles that are assembled by various manu-
facturers (from parts fabricated by numerous companies) and 
then driven by motorists. Who along this supply chain is liable—
the oil producers, the refiners, the fuel transporters, the filling 
stations, the vehicle manufacturers, the motorists? (The same 
sort of question could be asked, for example, about coal that is 
mined from the ground, sent by rail to a power plant, and burned 
there, generating electricity that travels by wire to homes, where 
it runs lights and appliances.) What principle is used in selecting 
the point(s) along the chain where liability attaches? How does 
a court assess the reasonableness of the conduct at each step 
in this chain?
8. goveRnmental liability. 
If a national or state government affirmatively encouraged 
fossil fuel use or other GHG-generating activities, such as 
through subsidies, leasing of publicly owned resources (e.g., 
offshore lands), provision of facilities for the use of the fuels 
(e.g., interstate highways), use of governmental powers (e.g., 
eminent domain), technological mandates, or direct purchases, 
does it share in the liability? What if the government knew of 
a risk but failed to take steps to protect its population, such as 
by building or enlarging flood protection levees? Is sovereign 
immunity a total bar to such claims, or have there been waivers? 
If the government would be liable but for sovereign immunity, is 
private defendants’ liability reduced proportionately?
9. non-industRial emissions. 
Approximately 61.4 percent of global GHG emissions result 
from energy use, and about 18.3 percent are attributed to defor-
estation.13 Much of this deforestation occurs on governmentally 
owned land. Are the entities that engaged in or allowed this 
deforestation liable? If so, would that include, for example, the 
governments of countries in South America and Africa, where 
the highest annual loss of forests is occurring?14
oTher Issues
GHG tort litigation would raise many other issues:
1. Causation. 
It has become a truism in climate policy circles that specific 
weather events cannot be attributed to GHG emissions.15 We 
can say that hurricanes, droughts, and heat waves will be more 
frequent and severe on a warmer planet, but such events occurred 
long before the industrial era; there has always been natural 
variability. How would the victims of one such event establish 
that it specifically was caused by climate change? Would they 
have to? What burden of proof would they have to bear? (This 
problem might be somewhat eased for injuries resulting from 
longer trends, such as coastal erosion and snowpack melt, and 
for expenses for reasonable adaptation efforts.)
2. Class aCtions. 
If causation can be established and defendants can be found 
who are potentially culpable, subject to the court’s jurisdiction, 
and sufficiently wealthy to be worth suing, the number of poten-
tial plaintiffs may be very large. A class action would be the 
natural way to proceed. The same day that the Supreme Court 
issued its decision in AEP v. Connecticut, it also announced 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,16 which evinced skepticism 
toward sprawling class actions.17 Will the courts now be receptive 
toward class actions against GHG emitters?
3. issue pReClusion. 
If this kind of litigation succeeds, any entity deemed to be a 
major emitter (e.g., a large electric utility) is likely to find itself 
the subject of multiple lawsuits. If it litigates its liability in one 
case and loses, is that holding binding against it in subsequent 
cases under doctrines such as res judicata? What if it litigates 
and wins one—can it use that victory in subsequent cases?
4. measuRe of damages. 
If a neighborhood is wiped out by an event that a court finds 
was caused by climate change, are only purely economic losses 
recoverable? What about the loss of community and other less 
tangible losses? Can anyone recover for loss of biodiversity and 
other ecological impacts? Can recovery be obtained for losses that 
are inevitable (as a result of the GHGs already in the atmosphere) 
but that will not be incurred for another generation or two?
5. assumption of Risk. 
If someone builds, or remains in, a house in an area now 
known to be vulnerable to flooding as a result of sea-level rise, and 
that house is in fact flooded, can the owner fully recover damages 
for the loss? Is there any obligation to avoid (or abandon) the area, 
or to mitigate damages in the face of newly understood perils?
6. insuRanCe CoveRage. 
Much of the litigation under CERCLA concerned insurance 
coverage for cleanup liability; the transaction costs were 
enormous.18
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Would the same pattern recur, with many or most GHG 
emitters seeking insurance coverage?
7. non-emissions ConduCt. 
In assessing the liability of a GHG emitter, are its quantified 
emissions the only factor? What if, as some of the pending suits 
allege, certain defendants misrepresented the science of climate 
change? Or what if some defendants offset their emissions by, 
for example, helping pay for a wind farm? Does any of this 
count in terms of imposing liability?
8. venue and Consolidation. 
If joint and several liability is the rule, and virtually every 
large GHG emitter in the world is ultimately brought in, there 
may be multiple litigations raising the same issues of liability 
(as opposed to damages) against many of the same parties. 
Where will these cases be brought? Will all the federal cases be 
consolidated before one district judge under the multidistrict liti-
gation rules?19 What becomes of the state cases? What happens 
if similar cases proceed in another common law country?
9. disCoveRy. 
What is the scope of discovery in these cases? May plain-
tiffs probe into corporate defendants’ industrial processes (to see 
whether there were opportunities to operate more efficiently), 
their public statements and private communications about 
climate change (to see whether there are inconsistencies), and 
their lists of suppliers and customers (in search of additional 
defendants)? May defendants explore whether the plaintiffs were 
themselves profligate energy users and whether they should have 
known not to live on a beach?
10. alien toRts. 
If a U.S. GHG emitter’s conduct is found to be tortious, 
may a resident of another country use the U.S. courts to claim 
damages?20 Would high GHG emissions rise to the level of 
extreme breach of long- accepted norms that is needed to trigger 
such claims? If so, what are the limits on how many foreigners 
may bring such cases?
concLusIon
As this Article shows, if any plaintiffs successfully make 
their way through the keyholes that may have been left by the 
Supreme Court in AEP, they and the courts in which they seek 
redress will still face extraordinary difficulties.
At its core, AEP is a separation of powers decision. Even 
those participating members of the Court who are presumably 
most enthusiastic about controlling GHGs agreed that the job 
of setting emissions limitations is beyond the competence of 
the courts and that Congress has assigned it to the EPA. If any 
trial court does eventually approach the merits of a suit seeking 
money damages for GHG emissions, it may find it is embarking 
down a wormhole, and upon comprehending the journey it may 
recoil. Interpreting and enforcing congressional and regula-
tory mandates is an important and proper role for the courts in 
confronting climate change; erecting a new liability scheme to 
redress the impacts of our economic system is an entirely differ-
ent and perilous voyage.
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